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I. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, ON Semiconductor Company completed its acquisition of SANYO 
Semiconductor from SANYO Electric on January 3, 2011.1 The acquisition 
continued ON Semiconductor’s transformation into a premier global supplier.2 
The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of ON Semiconductor emphasized that the 
acquisition enabled them to expand into the Japanese market and capture growth 
on a global basis.3 This acquisition was made possible because of SANYO 
Electric’s restructuring by demerging its unprofitable semiconductor unit into a 
wholly owned subsidiary.4 Prior to this acquisition, Hitachi and Mitsubishi 
Electric Corporation took advantage of special provisions under the Japanese 
Commercial Code for corporate reorganizations.5 They jointly established a new 
company, Renesas Technology Corp., and spun off both companies’ 
semiconductor businesses into Renesas.6 At the time, Renesas became one of the 
top three semiconductor companies in the world.7 
These successful demergers promoted the creation of the Japanese Bunkatsu 
Law, which eliminates impediments and facilitates corporate restructuring of 
Japanese companies.8 The term bunkatsu means demerger in Japanese and is 
similar to business transfers or asset sales in the United States.9 A demerger 
consists of a company splitting into two or more independent entities.10 In the 
United States, this is referred to as a spin-off.11 The kaisha bunkatsu is a type of 
corporate division (demerger) in Japan.12 It is a lawful way to restructure a failing 
 
1. ON Semiconductor Completes Acquisition of SANYO Semiconductor from SANYO Electric, ON 
SEMICONDUCTOR (Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.onsemi.com/PowerSolutions/newsItem.do?article=2458. 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Sanyo Electric to Sell Semiconductor Unit to U.S. Firm, ISTOCKANALYST (July 2, 2010, 7:06 AM), 
http://www.istockanalyst.com/article/viewiStockNews/articleid/4272805. 
5. See Hitachi and Mitsubishi Electric to Establish Renesas Technology Corp., A New Company for 
Semiconductor Operations, MITSUBISHI ELECTRIC (Oct. 3, 2002), http://www.mitsubishielectric.com/news/ 
news_releases/2002/mel0553.html. 
6. See id. 
7. See Hitachi, Mitsubishi Chip Merger Forms Powerhouse, EXTREME TECH (Oct. 3, 2002, 3:38 PM), 
http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/52106-hitachi-mitsubishi-chip-merger-forms-powerhouse. 
8. Why Japan’s New Corporate Separation Law is Increasing Restructurings, IFLR (Jan. 28, 2003), 
http://www.iflr.com/Article/2026997/Why-Japans-new-corporate-separation-law-is-increasing-
restructurings.html. 
9. See Christopher T. Hines, et al., Doing Deals in Japan: An Analysis of Recent Trends and 
Developments for the U.S. Practitioner, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 355, 388 (2006). 
10. Thomas Kirchmaier, Corporate Demergers: or is Divorce More Attractive than Marriage? 
CENTREPIECE, 15 (2001), http://cep.lse.ac.uk/centrepiece/v06i1/kirchmaier.pdf. 
11. Id. 
12. ABA Section of Antitrust Law, COMPETITION LAWS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, FIRST 
SUPPLEMENT, 323 (Daniel G. Swanson et. al. eds., 2005). 
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business or promote a healthy portion of a business.13 The law allows Japanese 
entities to split out business units and make them standalone entities by 
“operation of law,” meaning that any relevant consent of creditors or contract 
counterparties are not required.14 Many companies use the kaisha bunkatsu 
legitimately to further their position in the Japanese market.15 For example, the 
ON Semiconductor purchase agreement had specific provisions for contracts 
pertaining to the demerger.16 However, illegitimate use of the kaisha bunkatsu is 
apparent among mid-size and family owned Japanese companies.17 This presents 
an issue to the Ministry of Japan because business owners are successfully 
abusing the kaisha bunkatsu.18 
The future possibility of major corporations abusing the kaisha bunkatsu 
needs to be considered because the primary focus of the abuse pertains to the 
rights of creditors.19 Creditors remaining with the parent company are subject to 
the possibility of having no recourse in receiving payment from the debtor parent 
company and the newly formed company.20 The current construction of the 
kaisha bunkatsu allows creditors to be left with no recourse.21 In spite of this 
issue, the United States has recognized a kaisha bunkatsu (demerger): ON 
Semiconductor and SANYO Semiconductor in Arizona.22 The United States 
recognizes that the kaisha bunkatsu is a positive notion, but with the potential 
abuse of the kaisha bunkatsu,23 states might not recognize or enforce the 
demerger because it conflicts with their corporate laws.24 
This Comment addresses the potential conflict of laws issue with the 
enforceability of the kaisha bunkatsu in California. Part II describes the 
difference between the kaisha bunkatsu and the United States law governing 
spin-offs.25 Part III examines the issue between creditor’s protections in Japan 
and California.26 Part IV creates an illustration of the potential problem a United 
 
13. See Ko Wakabayashi & Yoshimune Muraji, Abusive Company Splits: Use and Abuse, IFLR (Apr. 1, 
2012), http://www.iflr.com/Article/3007268/Abusive-company-splits-Use-and-abuse.html. 
14. See Why Japan’s New Corporate Separation Law is Increasing Restructurings, supra note 8. 
15. See ON Semiconductor Completes Acquisition of SANYO Semiconductor from SANYO Electric, supra 
note 1; Hitachi and Mitsubishi Electric to Establish Renesas Technology Corp., A New Company for 
Semiconductor Operations, supra note 6; Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13. 
16. ON Semiconductor and SANYO Semiconductor Purchase Agreement 
17. See Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13. 
18. See id. 
19. See infra Part V. 
20. See Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13. 
21. See KAISHA-HOU [Corporation Law] [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 763 (Japan); 
Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13. 
22. ON Semiconductor Completes Acquisition of SANYO Semiconductor from SANYO Electric, supra 
note 1. 
23. See Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13. 
24. See Cal. Corp. Code §1107 (Deering 2014); see also Cal. Corp. Code § 1113 (Deering 2014). 
25. See infra Part II. 
26. See infra Part III. 
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States creditor could face if Japan does not amend the kaisha bunkatsu.27 This 
Comment will argue the kaisha bunkatsu is an effective tool for corporate 
restructuring and global economic development, and therefore California courts 
should recognize the kaisha bunkatsu and apply California corporation laws, 
providing protection to creditors.28 Additionally, Japan should amend the kaisha 
bunkatsu in order to provide the same.29 
II. SPIN-OFFS 
A. Brief Overview 
A spin-off is the distribution of stock in a subsidiary corporation by a parent 
corporation to its existing shareholders.30 The shareholders of the parent company 
are not required to surrender any stock in return.31 This transaction allows the 
business to operate in separate corporations.32 The split of the business will either 
form a parent-subsidiary relation or two corporations with a common holding 
company.33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27. See infra Part IV. 
28. See infra Part V. 
29. See infra Part V.A. 
30. Edwards S. Adams & Arijit Mukherji, Spin-offs, Fiduciary Duty, and The Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 
15, 17 (1999-2000). 
31. Id. 
32. FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 863 (Thomson Reuters/Foundation Press, 4th ed. 
2008). 
33. Id. 
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 28 
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A spin-off is attractive to companies for a variety of reasons.34 It can 
maximize shareholder value, unlock hidden value, increase revenue and attract 
investors, and make the corporation “fit and focused” by reorganization, to name 
a few.35 Historically, a spin-off has been used to facilitate mergers and 
acquisitions by allowing a corporation to remove obstacles.36 
The spin-off can raise issues such as: non-assignable assets, relief from 
liabilities, necessity of shareholder approval, fiduciary duties, tax, and securities 
law rules.37 Particularly, spin-offs can be potentially dangerous to creditors.38  
Abusive spin-offs are not common, but they can be used to defraud creditors by a 
fraudulent conveyance39 Creditors could lose their right to recourse because of 
this fraudulent transfer.40 Legal safeguards for this potential abuse exist, but are 
dependent on what country’s law is being applied.41 
B. The Kaisha Bunkatsu 
The kaisha bunkatsu is an amendment originally adopted in the Japanese 
Commercial Code in 2001.42 Japan’s laws relating to companies were originally 
scattered throughout the Commercial Code.43 Then, in 2005, Japan enacted the 
Companies Act (Kaisha-hou), which brought all the corporate legal provisions 
into one consolidated law.44 The Companies Act came into effect on May 1, 
200645 as the largest reform of its kind in 50 years.46 The rules under the 
Companies Act are the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice in Japan.47 The 
 
34. Adams & Mukherji, supra note 30, at 39. 
35. Id. at 39–44. 
36. Id. at 39. 
37. See GEVURTZ, supra, note 32 at 862-68 (describing the potential issues and abuses of the transaction). 
38. STEPHEN I. GLOVER, BUSINESS SEPARATION TRANSACTIONS SPIN-OFFS, SUBSIDIARY IPOS AND TRACKING 
STOCK 14-4 (ALM Properties Inc., 2006), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=Rxhxsmw8u 
6AC&printsec=frontcover &source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false. 
39. Adams & Mukherji, supra note 30, at 27 (discussing abusive spin-offs and fraudulent conveyance 
laws). 
40. GLOVER, supra note 38; Adams & Mukherji, supra note 30, at 33–38 
(discussing environmental fraudulent claims). 
41. See infra Part IV. 
42. ABA Section of Antitrust Law, supra note 12. 
43. Kenichi Osugi, Companies Act-Overview, TRANSPARENCY OF JAPANESE LAW PROJECT, http://www. 
tomeika.jur.kyushu-u.ac.jp/corporate/. 
44. Id.; Hajime Lieno & Takashi Saito, Whole Business Securitizations are Gaining Strength, ASIALAW 
(Aug. 2007), http://www.asialaw.com/Article/1989015/Whole-Business-Securitizations-Are-Gaining-Strength. 
html?Print=true&Single=true. 
45. The Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Corporate Disclosure in Japan Overview 5 
(6th ed., 2010), available at https://www.hp.jicpa.or.jp/english/about/publications/pdf/PUBLICATION-
Overview2010.pdf. 
46. See Japan’s New Corporations Law to Become Effective May 1, 2006, O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP 
(Mar. 29, 2006), http://www.omm.com/03-29-2006/. 
47. Osugi, supra note 43. 
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purpose of the Companies Act is to govern “[t]he formation, organization, 
operation and management of companies.”48 
The Companies Act permits several different types of corporate 
restructuring.49 The kaisha bunkatsu is a company split method whereby a 
company either transfers all or some of their rights and obligations to a receiving 
company (Kyûshû Bunkatsu) or a newly formed company (Shinsetsu Bunkatsu).50 
The Shinsetsu Bunkatsu is an incorporation demerger, meaning the parent 
company incorporated a new company by the transfer of their assets and 
liabilities from the parent company.51 The assets and liabilities are transferred as 
an operation of law.52 There are two different kinds of incorporation-type 
company splits provided in the Companies Act.53 The first is a split by which a 
stock company is incorporated and the second is a split by which a membership 
company is incorporated.54 Commonly, the first type is used in forming a newly 
incorporated company.55 
The kaisha bunkatsu has provided a lawful way for failing Japanese 
companies to restructure their company.56 Also, it allows a target company to 
split the desired business into a separate company.57 The splitting of a target 
company is useful when a bidder does not wish to acquire all of the target’s 
businesses.58 The typical procedure of a company using the kaisha bunkatsu for 
legitimate purposes begins with the parent company (splitting company) 
transferring the healthy part of the business to the newly formed corporation,59 
followed by the splitting company selling the newly formed corporation’s shares 
to a third party.60 Lastly, the splitting company pays the debts owed to creditors 
with the money from the sale, as does the newly formed corporation from the 
cash flow generated by the operation of the new business.61 It is not a statutory 
 
48. KAISHA-HOU, supra note 21. 
49. See id. (discussing part of the Companies Act setting out the regulations for entity conversions, 
mergers, and company splits). 
50. Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13; HIDEKI KANDA, ET AL., TRANSFORMING CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN EAST ASIA 53 (Routledge, 2008). 
51. Hines et al., supra note 9, at 390. 
52. Id. 
53. See ABA Section of Antitrust Law, supra note 12. 
54. KAISHA-HOU, supra note 21, at 763, 765. 
55. Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13. 
56. Id. 
57. Yoshihiko Fuchibe, et al., Country Q&A Japan 267 (Global Counsel Mergers and Acquisitions 
2003/04), http://www.tmi.gr.jp/wp-content/uploads/pdf/GCH_Mergers_and_Acquisitions_200304.pdf. 
58. Id. 
59. KAISHA-HOU, supra note 21, at 763, ¶ v; Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13. 
60. Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13. 
61. Id. 
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 28 
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requirement for the splitting company to consult with major creditors,62 but many 
do as a gesture of good faith.63 
There are statutory corporate restructuring methods that are subject to 
creditor protection procedures provided by the Companies Act;64 however, under 
the kaisha bunkatsu, creditors who remain with the splitting company are not 
protected.65 This results because the splitting company remains the guarantor66 
with no change to its financial situation, since the acquired shares of the newly 
formed company result in it becoming the splitting company’s wholly owned 
subsidiary.67 The company split differs from other merger methods68 because the 
splitting company has the authority to choose the rights and obligations 
transferred to the newly formed corporation and those that remain with it.69 Thus, 
the splitting company is not required to obtain consent from or inform creditors 
during the company split process.70 
C. The Business Spin-Off in the United States 
This kind of transaction described above implicates state corporate law,71 
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) § 355,72 the 1933 Securities Act, and possibly 
Article 6 of the U.C.C.73 The parent corporation spinning off a subsidiary 
distributes the stock of the subsidiary to its shareholders.74 Even though the 
distribution occurs without consideration, it is held to be a sale that triggers the 
registration requirements of the 1933 Securities Act.75 Certain conditions must be 
satisfied under IRC § 355 in order for the spin-off to be successful.76 
The spin-off may remove assets from the parent corporation, but it does not 
reduce the parent corporation’s debt or capital.77 Even if the spin-off company 
assumes part of the parent corporation’s debt, the parent corporation is still liable 
 
62. See KAISHA-HOU, supra note 21, at 763(2)(Corporation Law). 
63. Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13. 
64. Hines, supra note 10, at 390; Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13. 
65. Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13. 
66. KAISHA-HOU, supra note 21, at 764(Corporation Law). 
67. See id. 
68. Id. 
69. KAISHA-HOU, supra note 21, at 764, ¶v-vii. 
70. See Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13. 
71. GEVURTZ, supra note 32, at 864. 
72. Adams & Mukherji, supra note 30, at 17. 
73. See GEVURTZ, supra note 32, at 863. 
74. See Michael L. Schler, Simplifying and Rationalizing the Spin-off Rules, 56 SMU L. REV. 239, 241 
(2003). 
75. GEVURTZ, supra note 32, at 863-66 (explaining the different laws that regulate a spin-off in the 
United States, that are beyond the scope of this comment). 
76. See, e.g., Schler, supra note 74, at 241 (providing a list of conditions, that are beyond the scope of my 
comment). 
77. GEVURTZ, supra note 32, at 864. 
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to the creditor unless they receive a novation.78 This is why a creditor’s consent is 
required for contracts containing anti-assignment provisions.79 A number of laws 
protect creditors in spin-offs in the United States.80 Creditors can challenge the 
spin-off because of a fraudulent transfer.81 This is likely to happen when a 
creditor finds their option for payment is with the “bad” company.82 It is 
especially vital that care is given in allocating debt and liabilities during a spin-
off to ensure that the splitting company and the parent company are viable and 
any solvency risks have been considered.83 Thus, planners should consider 
creditors’ rights issues when preparing business spin-offs.84 
III. CREDITORS 
Creditors play an important role in corporate governance because they have 
control rights in a company.85 They influence major decisions of a company 
through controls when a company either defaults or violates a debt covenant.86 
For example, creditors could impose sanctions over a company’s restructuring 
such as mergers and acquisitions and spin-offs.87 However, the effectiveness of 
creditors’ rights depends on their rights being enforceable in courts.88 
A. Transfer by Operation of Law in Japan 
Japanese companies have used abusive company splits (ranyouteki-kaisha-
bunkatsu) to protect the interest of their equity holders to the detriment of their 
creditors.89 They are successful by using the kaisha bunkatsu in an evasive 
manner.
90
 The company isolates the healthy business, out of reach of creditors, 
into the newly formed company without informing creditors.91 This maneuver 
 
78. Id. 
79. See H. Justin Pace, Anti-Assignment Provisions, Copyright Licenses, and Intra-Group Mergers: The 
Effect of Cincom v. Novelis, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP 263, 265 (2010). 
80. See infra Part III.B for further explanation of the laws protecting creditors. 
81. BUSINESS SEPARATION TRANSACTIONS SPIN-OFFS, supra note 38; Adams & Mukherji, supra note 30, 
at 33-38. 
82. BUSINESS SEPARATION TRANSACTIONS SPIN-OFFS, supra note 38. 
83. Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Spin-Off Guide, 13 (2013), available at http://www.wlrk.com/ 
files/2013/spinoffguide.pdf. 
84. BUSINESS SEPARATION TRANSACTIONS SPIN-OFFS, supra note 38. 
85. Juzhong Zhuang, Some Conceptual Issues of Corporate Governance, 13 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK 
6 (June 1999). 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 28 
443 
differs from with other types of demergers in Japan that require disclosure and 
mandatory procedures to protect creditors.92 
The advantage of using the kaisha bunkatsu is the ability to transfer 
contractual rights and obligations as an operation of law without the consent of 
counterparties and creditors.93 The Ministry of Japan’s goal was to streamline the 
process and not require the company to negotiate consent from each contractual 
party.94 However, the kaisha bunkatsu protects creditors by requiring the splitting 
company to provide notice to creditors being transferred to the newly formed 
company.95 The creditor has the right to object to the transfer during the notice 
period, but failing to object results in the consent from the creditor.96 Creditors 
who object are provided alternative measures such as: repayment, appropriate 
collateral to secure their obligation, or sufficient assets are placed in a trust to 
secure repayment.97 This protection is only available to creditors being 
transferred and not to such creditors who remain with the splitting company.98 
Unknowingly, with the enactment of the kaisha bunkatsu, the Ministry of 
Japan created separate protections for creditors.99 It is debatable whether there is 
a practical value in the notice requirement because the splitting company’s rights 
and obligations are succeeded and not assigned to the newly formed company.100 
The power given to the splitting company to choose which rights and obligations 
to keep and transfer inevitably creates a potential detriment to creditors.101 As 
explained in more detail below, a creditor remaining with the splitting company 
could lose recourse to the newly formed company when a splitting company sells 
the newly formed company to a third party.102 A splitting company could file for 
bankruptcy or simply abandon the company leaving the creditor with few 
options.103 
The creditor remaining with the splitting company could sue or force the 
splitting company into bankruptcy, but the valuable assets will be untouchable 
because they are with the newly formed company.104 Basically, the splitting 
 
92. Hines, supra note 10, at 390. 
93. Why Japan’s New Corporate Separation Law is Increasing Restructurings, supra note 8. 
94. Id. 
95. See KAISHA-HOU, supra note 21, at 764(2)(Corporation Law). 
96. See Id. at §10(1) ¶ii (Corporation Law); Why Japan’s New Corporate Separation Law is Increasing 
Restructurings, supra note 8. 
97. Shareholder and Creditor Protection in Japanese Mergers, THE JAPAN TAX SITE (Feb. 7, 2011), 
http://japantax.org/?p=4355; KAISHA-HOU, supra note 21, at 789(5), 799(5). 
98. Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13 
99. See KAISHA-HOU, supra note 21, at 764(2) (describing which creditors requires notice). 
100. See id. at 763, ¶v; Why Japan’s New Corporate Separation Law is Increasing Restructurings, supra 
note 8. 
101. See Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13. 
102. See id. 
103. See id. 
104. See id. 
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company “foist[ed] all [its] debt on an empty shell” while the valuable business 
continues to make money free of debt.105 This is profitable for the splitting 
company because it can now sell the newly formed company free of 
encumbrances.106 This is important because usually buyers only want to acquire 
the profitable division of the Japanese company.107 
B. Transfer by Operation of Law in California 
Conversely, California corporate law specifically protects against this 
potential abuse of power by a splitting company.108 A number of laws in the 
United States such as state fraudulent conveyances laws, the Bankruptcy Code, 
and the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act also protect creditors in a spin-
off.109 Upon a merger, all the rights of creditors and all liens are preserved and 
unimpaired.110 Further, if a corporation disappears, any action or proceeding 
against it will be prosecuted and the judgment will bind the surviving 
corporation.111 The parent company remains liable to a creditor without a 
novation despite the transfer of obligations to the newly formed company.112 
A creditor left with the splitting company has the right to bring a suit against 
the newly formed company by claiming fraudulent conveyance.113 The transfer 
without fair consideration to the splitting company is a fraudulent conveyance if 
the splitting company is insolvent or left without sufficient capital.114 The transfer 
can also be found to be fraudulent if the debtor made the transfer of the splitting 
company with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the creditor.115 
Further, the Bankruptcy Code protects the creditor.116 If the splitting company 
files bankruptcy, the bankruptcy trustee or debtor in possession has the authority 
 
105. Hiroyuki Yagi & Masakazu Kaji, Escaping your Debts in Japan, ZJAPANR 259, 261 (2003). 
106. Id.; Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13. 
107. See How to buy a Japanese Company, IFLR (Jan. 28, 2003), http://www.iflr.com/Article/ 
2026998/How-to-buy-a-Japanese-company.html. 
108. Cal. Corp. Code §1107 (Deering 2014); Cal. Corp. Code § 1113 (Deering 2014). 
109. See generally 11 U.S.C.S. §548 (2014); Corp. §1107; Cal. Civ. Code §3439.04 (Deering 2014). 
110. Corp. §1107; Corp. §1113. 
111. Corp. §1107; Corp. §1113. 
112. GEVURTZ, supra note 32. 
113. Economy Refining & Serv. Co., Inc. v. Royal National Bank of New York, 20 Cal.App.3d 434, 439 
(1st Dist. 1971). 
114. Cal. Civ. Code §3439.04(a)(2) (Deering 2014). 
115. See Civ. §3439.04(a)(1); see also Civ. §3439.04(b) for the factors to determine the actual intent of 
the debtor. 
116. See generally Thomas H. Day, Solution for Conflict of Laws Governing Fraudulent Transfers: Apply 
the Law That Was Enacted to Benefit the Creditors, 48 BUS. LAW. 889, 900, (1992-1993) (describing how the 
bankruptcy code is used). 
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to avoid the fraudulent transfer under applicable state law.117 These legal 
safeguards protect against abusive spin-offs.118 
C. Abuse of Creditors in Japan 
Small and mid-sized Japanese companies usually owned by individuals or 
family members have successfully utilized the kaisha bunkatsu in an evasive 
manner.
119
 There are a number of different ways the Japanese company can 
defraud a creditor.120 The Japanese splitting company decides to transfer its rights 
and creditor obligations pertaining to the valuable part of the business to the 
newly formed company.121 Then, the splitting company decides whether it will 
transfer some creditors, all creditors, or no creditors to the newly formed 
company.122 Normally, the creditors left with the splitting company are not 
informed of this process.123 
Once the newly formed company is established, the splitting company’s 
owners begin the process of separating themselves from the newly formed 
company.124 This part of the splitting process is where the defrauding of creditors 
occurs.
125
 The owners of the splitting company will sell the newly formed 
company to one of their family members for a nominal value.126 This method is 
simply used to legally relinquish control of the newly formed company,127 thus 
allowing the original owners to maintain their ties to the valuable newly formed 
company without the encumbrances left with the splitting company.128 This 
method of fraud can be taken one step further when the family members decide 
to sell a large number of the new shares to an equity sponsor, who could be a 
consultant or other family members, thereby allowing the owners of the splitting 
company to effectively shift economic control over the newly formed company.129 
Finally, the owners of the splitting company will either commence bankruptcy 
proceedings or abandon the company, thus leaving the creditor with limited 
options for recourse.130 
 
117. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (2014). 
118. Adams & Mukherji, supra note 30. 
119. Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13. 
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Japan and California have similar fraudulent conveyance and bankruptcy 
laws when dealing with fraudulent acts of companies.131 In California, the 
creditors would be able to contest the transfer of the newly formed company to 
the owner’s family members under fraudulent conveyance laws.132 If the owner of 
the splitting company files for bankruptcy, the trustee or debtor in possession can 
deem the transfer of the newly formed company fraudulent allowing creditors 
recourse from the company.133 Also, abandoning the splitting company would 
allow creditors to bring their claims for recourse against the newly formed 
company.134 Conversely, in Japan, even with similar protections, the creditors left 
with the splitting company have limited recourse options dependent on certain 
courts.135 
The Companies Act contains a provision applicable to a business transfer that 
holds the transferee of the business transfer liable for the transferor’s obligations 
to creditors.136 However, this provision does not apply to a statutory company 
split method (including the kaisha bunkatsu).137 Certain Japanese courts have 
allowed creditors to avoid fraudulent transfers under the fraudulent acts and 
bankruptcy act of the Civil Code.138 The courts recognize that the Companies Act 
does not provide any protection to creditors.139 However, other courts argue the 
Civil Code is not applicable because the Companies Act has its own provisions.140 
Thus, a creditor with the splitting company is guaranteed protection in California, 
but is provided limited protection in Japan.141 
IV. CONSIDERATION OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 
A. Creditor Brings Suit 
Creditors have no domestic solution in Japan when a company uses the 
kaisha bunkatsu and leaves the creditor with the splitting company.142 A creditor 
evaluating its options looks to see if there is a difference between the United 
States and Japanese laws.143 This could create a forum shopping issue because a 
creditor would want to bring a case in the United States since the law is more 
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favorable towards creditors compared to Japan.144 However, the choice of forum 
does not always dictate the choice of law.145 Thus, if a creditor brings a claim 
against a United States corporation the courts could be faced with a conflict of 
laws issue, which is illustrated by the hypothetical provided below. 
Suppose a creditor from California (creditor) decides to loan money to a 
Japanese company (Company A).146 Company A is not as profitable as it hoped to 
be, but one part of the business is profitable.147 Company A decides to unlock the 
hidden value of this business and uses the kaisha bunkatsu to create Company 
B.148 Company A chooses to use the kaisha bunkatsu because it wants Company 
B to be unencumbered, making it attractive to potential buyers.149 Company A 
then sells Company B to a corporation located in California (Company C). 
Company A is abandoned leaving with it all of its debts.150 The creditor has no 
recourse in Company A and decides to bring his claim against Company C who 
purchased Company B.151 Company C argues it should not be held liable because 
it acquired Company B free of encumbrances from Company A.152 
In the example above, the California court will be faced with a conflict of 
laws issue since Company B was incorporated in Japan, but was acquired by a 
California corporation.153 A creditor in California has a right to bring a fraudulent 
conveyance claim, but a creditor in Japan does not have this protective right.154 
However, in this case it is a California creditor bringing the claim and the court 
must decide whether it will apply Japan’s or California’s corporation laws, and 
depending on whose laws apply, whether or not Company C is liable for 
Company A’s debt. 
B. Court’s Discussion 
1. Internal Affairs Doctrine 
Applying the Internal Affairs Doctrine allows the court to determine which 
state’s law applies in the case.155 The Internal Affairs Doctrine says the state of 
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incorporation governs the rights and liabilities of a corporation.156 It is a conflict 
of law principle allowing only one state the authority to regulate a corporation’s 
internal affairs.157 However, courts differ on the application of this principal 
because of the distinction of what qualifies as an internal affair.158 Thus, the 
creditor would need to prove its right is an internal affair in order for the 
principal to apply.159 
However, courts in California are not permitted to control the internal affairs 
of foreign corporations.160 The internal affairs of a corporation have been 
recognized as matters relating to the relationships of the corporation and its 
officers, directors, and shareholders.161 It focuses on the organic structure or 
internal administration of a corporation.162 The creditor’s right would not be 
considered an internal affair because the right is not connected to the company’s 
incorporation steps such as: issuance of shares, holding director and 
shareholders’ meetings, charter amendments, etc.163 Based on this application of 
the Internal Affairs Doctrine the court would apply Japan’s law because the state 
of incorporation governs the liabilities of the corporation164 and the creditor 
would have no protective right to bring the suit against the California company.165 
However, California courts recognize there are certain exceptions to the 
Internal Affairs Doctrine.166 In the interest of justice, a local court could apply the 
local law over the Internal Affairs Doctrine.167 This could be done because 
California has an interest in protecting its residents against fraud with the sale of 
corporations.168 The court could apply local law when it finds the foreign 
corporation has its principal place of business in the local state.169 The creditor 
could make a strong argument using both exceptions. The creditor could prove 
Company A deliberately used the kaisha bunkatsu to create Company B without 
encumbrances.170 This deliberate act by Company A is a fraudulent action 
California courts would want to protect their residents from.171 Further, the 
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creditor could prove Company B’s principal place of business is in California 
since it was acquired by a California corporation.172 The court would exercise 
jurisdiction because making the creditor bring suit against Company B in Japan 
would be an inappropriate and inconvenient forum since Company B’s business 
records are in California.173 Based on this application of the Internal Affairs 
Doctrine the court would apply California’s law and the creditor would have a 
protective right to bring a fraudulent claim against Company C.174 
2. Applying California’s Law 
The court will not necessarily apply California law.175 The Internal Affairs 
Doctrine is one approach the court will consider when determining choice of 
law.176 The court may additionally look at the First Restatement or the Second 
Restatement pertaining to conflict of laws.177 The First Restatement follows a 
rules approach while the Second Restatement applies a balancing test.178 The First 
Restatement does not seek to determine whether there is a valid contract until it 
determines the place of the principal event.179 The place of the principal event is 
vital because it is the law of the place of contracting that determines the validity 
of the contract.180 The Second Restatement allows for the contracting parties to 
include a choice of law provision in their contract.181 However, absent a choice of 
law provision, the choice of law is determined by which state has the most 
significant relationship to the transaction.182 The factors the court balances are: 
“(a) the place of contracting, (b) the place of negotiation of the contract, (c) the 
place of performance, (d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and 
(e) the domicil[e], residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of 
business of the parties.”183 Further, if the place of negotiation and performance 
are in the same state, then that state’s law will apply.184 
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If the court looks to either of the conflict of law Restatements,185 the creditor 
might be left with no recourse because it would apply Japan’s laws.186 The First 
Restatement analysis focuses on where the right vested, and particularly with 
contracts, the place of the creation of the contract.187 Thus, Japan’s law would 
apply because the contract was created in Japan, thereby vesting the creditor’s 
rights in Japan.188 The Second Restatement analysis provides a complex balancing 
test of different factors,189 assuming the creditor and Company A did not have a 
choice of law provision in their contract. This is a case-by-case determination 
and a highly factual application.190 Thus, balancing the factors, the court could 
apply Japan’s law. However, policy reasons behind the Restatement—state of 
dominant interest and to seek justice—could move the court to apply California 
law.191 
Assuming the court determines California’s corporation law applies (local 
law),192 the court is left with the task to determine whether this conveyance was 
fraudulent and if Company C is liable for Company A’s debt.193 The kaisha 
bunkatsu allows for Company A to create Company B without encumbrances.194 
However, California law does not permit Company A to create Company B to the 
detriment of creditors.195 
Company C typically does not assume Company A’s liability unless the 
transfer of Company B to Company C is for the fraudulent purpose of escaping 
liability for Company A’s debts.196 Company A used the kaisha bunkatsu to 
unlock the hidden value of its company by creating Company B and retaining all 
the debt.197 Company A then sold Company B to Company C, which prohibited 
recourse for the creditor because Company B held the valuable assets of 
Company A.198 Company A deliberately sold Company B to hinder the creditor.199 
Thus, the creditor is left without many options because of this fraudulent 
conveyance.200  Company C argues it did not purchase Company B with the intent 
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to defraud the creditor since it believed Company B was free of encumbrances. 
The court is unlikely to accept this argument because Company A was 
abandoned.201 Company C will be held liable if the predecessor corporation 
disappears.202 Therefore, the creditor could potentially bring an action against 
Company A and the judgment would be binding on Company C.203 The court is 
likely to hold Company C liable for Company A’s debts because it acquired 
Company B, which was created with the intent to foist off Company A’s debts.204 
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
The potential abuse of the kaisha bunkatsu by major corporations raises a 
significant issue.205 The above hypothetical illustrates the distinction between 
Japanese and Californian corporate laws.206 Japan’s law places the California 
courts in the difficult position of determining whether to adopt international law 
or to apply California law to protect a California creditor.207 Even though the 
kaisha bunkatsu benefits Japanese corporate restructuring,208 certain aspects of it 
should be amended or California courts need to determine how to enforce it. 
A. Japan Amends the Kaisha Bunkatsu 
Amending the kaisha bunkatsu is the best solution for the issues presented. 
The Ministry of Japan is aware of the statutory flaws regarding creditors with the 
kaisha bunkatsu.209 It considered amending the Companies Act to address these 
issues.210 However, other corporate scandals involving Japanese corporations 
occurred in 2011, which changed the Ministry of Japan’s focus to amending the 
Companies Act.211 The proposed amendments to the kaisha bunkatsu have not 
been approved.212 The Ministry of Japan’s proposed amendments focus on the 
rights of creditors left with the splitting company.213 The amendment provides 
creditors, harmed by the company split, the ability to exercise their rights against 
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the newly incorporated company.214 The Ministry of Japan should adopt this 
amendment because it will aid in ending the abusive company splits by 
businesses using the kaisha bunkatsu.215 
B. Options for the California Courts 
1. Do Not Recognize the Demerger 
California courts are not required to enforce international law.216 The courts 
have the authority to determine the choice of law to apply determined by the 
Internal Affairs Doctrine.217 In this event, California has an interest in protecting 
their creditors and its public policy would be offended if it applied Japanese 
law.218 If the court holds the Internal Affairs Doctrine inapplicable then it will 
apply California’s corporation laws.219 Since California’s corporation laws 
regarding spin-offs are in conflict with Japan’s Companies Act regarding kaisha 
bunkatsu, the court could focus on the legality of the demerger in Japan.220 
Applying California corporate law would invalidate the demerger because it was 
created to the detriment of creditors.221 Thus, the court would not recognize the 
newly incorporated company from the splitting company.222 
Not recognizing the demerger and invalidating the newly formed company 
creates a significant issue for the splitting company, purchasing company, and 
creditor.223 The newly formed company is left in limbo because it is 
acknowledged in Japan, but not in California.224 This action does not solve the 
creditor’s problem because it will not have recourse in Japan or California.225 The 
creditor is left with the original problem of recovering debt from the newly 
incorporated company.226 Further, the purchasing company is left with an 
invalidated sale.227 The purchasing company cannot legally buy the newly 
incorporated company because the California court does not recognize the newly 
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incorporated company (as if the company does not exist).228 This extreme action 
by the California courts would affect the global economy because California 
corporations will not be able to purchase demerged Japanese companies.229 
However, this action could create an economic incentive for Japan to amend the 
kaisha bunkatsu because it limits the number of potential purchasers and 
creditors.230 
2. Recognize the Demerger 
The kaisha bunkatsu has been used successfully for Japanese corporate 
restructuring by major corporations.231 If the California courts decide to not 
recognize the kaisha bunkatsu this would negatively impact future valid Japanese 
corporate restructurings.232 The purpose of the kaisha bunkatsu is to facilitate 
corporate restructurings not to defraud creditors.233 However, the statutory flaws 
in the kaisha bunkatsu allow for potential abuse from the splitting company.234 
This is an important distinction because the Ministry of Japan did not knowingly 
create this potential for abuse.235 Therefore, the California court should recognize 
the kaisha bunkatsu but create a protection to creditors regarding the recourse of 
debt. 
The California court should validate the demerger by the splitting company 
using the kaisha bunkatsu even if it applies California’s corporation laws after 
the choice of law determination.236 The court should apply California’s 
corporation laws to protect the creditor from the splitting company’s fraudulent 
conveyance.237 The creditor should be allowed to make a claim against the newly 
incorporated company even though it has been sold to an acquiring company.238 
This is fair to the acquiring company because it should have done its due 
diligence in forming the newly incorporated company before completing the 
purchase.239 The acquiring company should not be protected against the creditor 
because Japan allowed the newly incorporated company to be formed without 
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encumbrances.240 The acquiring company in California is aware of the laws to 
protect a creditor from a disappearing corporation and how a newly incorporated 
company cannot be formed to hinder creditors.241 The California court has to 
apply California’s corporation laws to protect creditors because if it were to 
apply only Japan’s law, public policy would be offended.242 
C. Adopting the Kaisha Bunkatsu 
The kaisha bunkatsu was created by the Ministry of Japan to streamline the 
demerger process.243 The Ministry’s intentions were to allow failing Japanese 
companies to restructure quickly without having to negotiate with each individual 
creditor or counterparty.244 The enactment of the Bunkatsu Law led to more than 
300 reported transactions utilizing the new kaisha bunkatsu process.245 Other 
countries should adopt the kaisha bunkatsu because it provides a statutory 
demerger,246 allowing companies to successfully restructure and unlock hidden 
value of their businesses without requiring third party consent.247 This process 
allows companies to quickly and successfully restructure their businesses, which 
furthers the country’s economic development and lessens its bankruptcy cases.248 
However, if a country decides to adopt the kaisha bunkatsu it should be aware of 
the potential abuse towards creditors. 249 
The Ministry of Japan unknowingly created separate protections for creditors 
depending on whether the creditor remained with the splitting company or newly 
formed company.250 This was an oversight by the Ministry of Japan because the 
Companies Act provides a protection to creditors applicable to a business 
transfer.251 However, the kaisha bunkatsu is considered a statutory company split 
and not a business transfer, which leaves the creditors with the splitting company 
unprotected.252 Japan’s courts are trying to alleviate this situation by attempting to 
apply their fraudulent conveyance laws and bankruptcy laws, but the courts are 
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lacking in uniformity.253 Some courts hold the newly formed company can be 
held liable for the splitting company’s creditor obligations, but others hold the 
fraudulent conveyance and bankruptcy laws cannot apply since the Companies 
Act provides its own protection provisions.254 Thus, a country should focus on the 
legal mistakes made by the Ministry of Japan before it adopts the kaisha 
bunkatsu.255 
If a country chooses to adopt the kaisha bunkatsu, the legislature needs to 
modify the procedure. Even though the kaisha bunkatsu allows a company to 
demerge without the consent of third parties,256 the third parties’ obligations 
should still be protected.257 Unlike in Japan, California protects creditors through 
its corporation laws, bankruptcy laws, and fraudulent conveyance laws.258 Japan 
has similar laws, but the protection provisions in the Companies Act trump 
them.259 A country with a similar legal system to Japan should provide creditors, 
whether with the splitting company or newly formed company, harmed by the 
demerger the right to bring a claim against the newly formed company.260 The 
legislature needs to focus on the potential defrauding of creditors in order to 
successfully adopt the kaisha bunkatsu.261 Adopting the kaisha bunkatsu could 
eliminate impediments to business restructurings,262 which in turn furthers the 
country’s economic development.263 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The kaisha bunkatsu is an important tool for corporate restructurings in 
Japan.264 Unfortunately, the successful abuse of the kaisha bunkatsu by mid-size 
and family owned Japanese businesses establish the potential abuse by major 
corporations.265 Creditors left with the splitting company are subject to the 
possibility of no recourse in Japan.266 Creditors from California who invest in 
Japanese companies will be unprotected if the Japanese company utilizes the 
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kaisha bunkatsu.267 The Ministry of Japan should pass amendments to the kaisha 
bunkatsu allowing creditors harmed by the splitting company the right of 
recourse against the newly formed company.268 Nevertheless, if Japan does not 
amend the kaisha bunkatsu, the California courts should recognize the newly 
formed company but allow creditors the right to a claim against the newly 
formed company.269 In order for the kaisha bunkatsu to continue to be a 
legitimate Japanese corporate restructuring tool, these suggestions should be 
taken into account. 
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